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Goals
 Improved ease of use and safety
• Long-term goals: automotive-like training and workload & better-than automotive 
safety
• Ease-of-use encompasses initial and recurrent training, preflight & in-flight 
workload
Benefits
 Necessary (but not sufficient) for practical aircraft-based ODM
 Faster, less risk averse, lower-cost proving ground for new technology and 
operations beneficial to transport aircraft
 Technologies that help address NTSB’s Most-Wanted aviation safety
improvements
• General aviation loss of control
• Public helicopter safety
• Procedural compliance
Goals and Benefits
ODM Safety and Ease of Use
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Gulf of Technology, Policy, and Acceptance
Contemporary,
Highly Automated
Aircraft
Flying that’s as Easy 
(…or Easier) and Safer 
than Driving.
What are the Challenges?
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Alignment of proposed ODM research with NASA Strategic 
Thrusts
Performance requirements and current state of the art
• How safe is safe enough and is it achievable?
• How has technology simplified piloting already?
• Emerging automation technologies
“Simplified Vehicle Operations” (SVO), proposed research 
strategy
• Planned evolution & incremental revolution
• Pilots -> Trained operators -> users
Next steps
Presentation Outline: Safety and Ease of Use
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NASA Aeronautics Strategic Thrusts
Safe, Efficient Growth in Global Operations
• Enable full NextGen and develop technologies to substantially 
reduce aircraft safety risks
Innovation in Commercial Supersonic Aircraft
• Achieve a low-boom standard
Ultra-Efficient Commercial Vehicles
• Pioneer technologies for big leaps in efficiency and 
environmental performance
Transition to Low-Carbon Propulsion
• Characterize drop-in alternative fuels and pioneer 
low-carbon propulsion technology
Real-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance
• Develop an integrated prototype of a real-time safety 
monitoring and assurance system
Assured Autonomy for Aviation Transformation
• Develop high impact aviation autonomy applications
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NASA Aeronautics Strategic Thrusts: Safety, Ease
Safe, Efficient Growth in Global Operations
• Enable full NextGen and develop technologies to 
substantially reduce aircraft safety risks
Innovation in Commercial Supersonic Aircraft
• Achieve a low-boom standard
Ultra-Efficient Commercial Vehicles
• Pioneer technologies for big leaps in efficiency and 
environmental performance
Transition to Low-Carbon Propulsion
• Characterize drop-in alternative fuels and pioneer 
low-carbon propulsion technology
Real-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance
• Develop an integrated prototype of a real-time safety 
monitoring and assurance system
Assured Autonomy for Aviation Transformation
• Develop high impact aviation autonomy applications
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NASA Aeronautics Strategic Thrusts: Safety, Ease
Outcome: Assured autonomy for aviation transformation
ODM Contributions: Significantly simplified piloting skills and 
training for manned aircraft while increasing system safety and 
capability. (ODM Tech challenge 2)
Outcome: Develop technologies to substantially reduce aircraft safety 
risks.
ODM Contributions: Increase future small aircraft safety by >10x 
through combined vehicle, propulsion, and trusted autonomy 
technologies.  (ODM Tech challenge 3)
ODM  provides a technology introduction, validation path for transports
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NASA Aeronautics Strategic Thrusts: Safety, Ease
2013 Total aviation fatalities: 443,
420 in general aviation and Part 135 operations
….95% of total
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Mode
Fatalities per hundred 
million passenger miles
Rate relative to 
passenger cars
Passenger Cars 0.643 1.0
US Airline Flights 0.0038 167x safer
Commuter Airlines
(<10 passengers)
0.102 6.7x safer
General Aviation 7.8 (estimated)
12x less safe
Performance: How Safe is Safe Enough?
Challenge:  Bring the safety of all transportation by 
small aircraft up to the level demonstrated by 
commuter airlines
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How Has Technology Simplified Piloting?
1990’s 2015
+ tablet-based 
electronic flight bag 
for additional
pre and in-flight 
awareness
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Operationally the change has been tremendous,  
improving utility, efficiency, average workload, comfort, 
potential safety, etc.
• Navigation / position awareness
• Coupled autopilots
• Access to information pre and in-flight
• Electronic flight bags / tablets
• System monitoring, failure detection
But…
How Has Technology Simplified Piloting?
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…Becoming and remaining proficient & vigilant is as, if 
not more, challenging than ever before
• Typically, greater than 500 hours and $30,000 required to 
become experienced instrument pilot
• Required knowledge and skills have increased, not decreased
• System and mode complexity has increased
Variations between aircraft, software loads
• Pilot expected to detect, troubleshoot & backstop wider range 
of non-normals
• Average workload is much lower, but peaks remain high, if not 
higher
How Has Technology Simplified Piloting?
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How Has Technology Simplified Piloting ?
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/data/Pages/2012%20Aviation%20Accidents%20Summary.aspx
 …Realized safety has not significantly changed
2013
2014 
Goal
Preliminary
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Top Accident Categories
• Significant improvement in accident rate by addressing basic errors
• Automotive-level safety achievable by improving relatively deterministic functions
• Age of current fleet contributes to component failure rate
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Are Autonomous Systems a Light on the Horizon? 
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Definitely, but We Should Be Realistic
Costs are plummeting (sensor, computers, data algorithms)
But:
• Rate of progress more modest that typically reported…
A2003
2003, Honda offers active lane
keeping assist (0.2 lateral g)
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Function Allocation, Humans and Automation
Cummings, 2014; Rasmussen, 1983
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Definitely, but We Should Be Realistic
Costs are plummeting (sensors, computers, data, connectivity)
But:
• Rate of progress more modest that typically reported…
• Performance in complex, novel situations likely to remain brittle
• Less capable but more reliable systems may have better return on 
investment
 It’s the corner cases that drive skills, training, monitoring, and costs not the 
nominal
• Regulators need statistically significant operational histories before 
approving critical reliance on new technologies & operations without 
reversion to proven
 One revolution at a time
5/11/2016 19
Transition from expert pilots -> trained operators -> users
• Key steps:
1. Demanding flight-critical, but deterministic tasks transitioned from 
human to ultra-reliable automation: sub-system failures must not 
effect performance
o Simplified flight control and loss-of-control prevention, navigation, 
propulsion and systems management
o Must avoid Air France 447-like scenarios
o Initially use non-deterministic autonomy as non-critical decision 
aids and in emergency situations (e.g. landing with incapacitated 
pilot) to gain operational experience, confidence
2. As trust develops, transition tasks and responsibilities from human to 
autonomy
• Operator training, licensing must evolve with technology, but 
full credit lags behind
Pathway to Simplified Vehicle Operations (SVO)
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 SVO-1  (2016 – 2026):  Key deterministic tasks relegated to automation
• Technology mitigates pilot as single-point of failure
• Immediately benefits thin-haul commuter ops and latent small aircraft markets
• Expect only incremental airworthiness certification accommodation, but lays foundation 
for future
• Current FAA training required (e.g. ab initio-to IFR in minimum of 70 hours)
• New pilots capable of comfortable, confident, near-all weather ops.
 SVO-2  (2021 – 2036):  SPC, Simplified Pilot Certificate
• Simplified training & licensing based on research and operational experience from SVO-1
• New flight system, interfaces, and operation standards that allow updates to training and 
operational regulations in Part 61, 91, and 135 taking full advantage of technology
• Goal ab initio to near-all weather pilot in <40 hours (similar to driver training)
 SVO-3 (2031 - 2051):  Autonomous operations
• Autonomy fully responsible; user involvement in flight is optional
3 Epochs of Simplified Vehicle Operation (SVO)
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Simplified Vehicle Operation (SVO) Roadmap
2016 2021 2026 2031
Ultra-reliable automation
Semi-autonomous aiding
and self-preservation
SVO 1 Guidelines
Certification Standards
2nd generation flight 
systems 
Revised pilot, knowledge, 
training and certification
SVO-2 Flight 
Test, Demo
Simplified Pilot Certificate 
Consensus Standards
SVO 3 fundamental research, requirements analysis, UAS assessment
2036
Simplified Pilot
Interaction & Interface
SVO-1 Flight 
Test, Demo
Thin-Haul Commuter Demo
Ab Initio Demo
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Next Steps
Build community of interest and consensus
Effort includes building a community, not just 
technology
• Participation of industry, academia and the FAA essential to 
project formulation, execution, commercialization 
• Oshkosh forums, July 21 (public) and 22 (Industry)
• Kansas City workshop in collaboration with FAA
Nominally late October
Connectivity and partnerships with other ARMD, NASA, 
DoD, DOT investments, programs
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Questions
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Backup Material
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 Small, commuter airline record highlights that even 
current small aircraft can conduct scheduled 
operations with safety higher than cars
 Note, equivalent safety per mile may not be societally sufficient if new 
mode is used to travel many more miles
• Annual or life-time risk given typical exposure might be more appropriate
 E.g 12.5K miles/per year by car for 80 years =  1,000,000 miles and a 0.63% 
lifetime risk of fatality
Performance: How Safe is Safe Enough?
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Underlying safety-critical technologies enabling SVO 1 & 
2 are resilient automation, not non-deterministic 
machine intelligence
• Human retains overall responsibility for safety of flight, but is totally relived 
from many low-level tasks and responsibilities that 1) increase training, 2) 
often bite (e.g. stall awareness)
 Integrate existing, near-existing technologies to create deterministic automation as 
reliable as structure
 Machine intelligence introduced, but not for safety-critical tasks; gain experience 
before critical reliance
 Possibility of support from off-board personal, for example
oPre-flight, loading
oDispatcher-like support
Technologies Critical to SVO-1 and 2
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Underlying safety-critical technologies enabling SVO 1 & 
2 are resilient automation, not non-deterministic 
machine intelligence
• Sub-component failures, rare-normals must not require novel piloting skills, 
for example
 Engine-out
 Ice encounter
 Loss of GPS
• Automation capable of emergency landing if pilot incapacitated
 Digital (and/or physical) parachute
 Much less demanding than full-mission automation due to special handling by 
other elements of the system (e.g. traffic cleared away) and relaxed cert 
requirements due to rarity of use (back-up to a rare event, not primary capability)
• Dissimilar strengths and limitations of human and automation increase joint 
system safety and performance while reducing costs and certification risk
Technologies Critical to SVO-1 and 2,cont.
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 Final convergence of UAS and manned aviation
• Passenger carrying UAS
 Requires fundamental breakthroughs in machine intelligence
• Time horizon uncertain
• Current reliability of autonomous aircraft maybe 99.9% (in benign 
weather), but carrying humans as cargo requires 99.9999% or better
 Full autonomy is estimated to be > 3-4 orders of magnitude more challenging 
than required for SVO-1 or 2 
 Incremental introduction still needed validate safe operation in real-world, 
novel situations
o UAS experience will useful, but sUAS likely to take advantage of options not 
appropriate for manned aircraft and larger UAS likely to rely on remote pilots
 SVO-3 leverages SVO 1, 2 and of course, advance autonomous vehicle 
research
• Ideally, common-core across vehicle classes, applications
SVO-3 Technologies
